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The Political and Social Natures of the State of Exception 
The main questions regarding the political and social natures of the state 
of emergency concern: the restriction of individual freedoms as an 
innate power of the State to assure its continued existence –
and of its democratic regime- in times of national crisis; the 
exception as being a transitional phase from democracy to 
autocracy or dictatorship; and, the legitimization of a 
permanent state of exception through consensus. 
 
Carl Schmitt stated that ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (1). 
This means that the exception, which he defined as the application of 
extraordinary measures, is what constitutes the essence of the highest 
power of the State. Schmitt, following Bodin and Hobbes, emphasized the 
extralegal nature of the State’s sovereign power. The State could not exist 
without the possibility of exception. In fact, the State was born from the 
exception and relied on it for its survival (2). Therefore, the state of 
exception could not be framed within the legal order. Sovereignty cannot 
be limited; it is an absolute. Laws are created by the State, but the State’s 
sovereign power –the exception- has to remain outside the boundaries of 
the rule of law. This was the only way that the exception could function as 
the mechanism that guaranteed the State’s survival in moments of grave 
peril. To Schmitt, there was no point arguing about lesser or greater evils. 
The State had to prevail always. Order, even a dictatorial one, was 
preferable to revolution and anarchy. The permanent elimination of 
individual freedoms was, at all times, more desirable than the extinction 
of the State. Schmitt was deeply influenced by the 1918-1919 Revolution, 
following Germany’s defeat in World War I, and by the early chaotic years 
of the Weimer Republic. He considered, taking on Weber in extremis, 
that the State was the absolute embodiment of the monopoly of the use of 
violence. Legitimacy did not matter because authority –the sovereign- 
was the real source of law, not a Rousseaunian state of nature or the 
people’s will (3). The State creates and maintains law through force. 
When the monopoly is broken, because violence is being used against the 
State from outside or within, the exception assures its reestablishment.  
 
Other authors have considered the survival of the sovereign body at all 
costs, perceived as a lesser evil when weighted against the greater evil of 
its possible decease, as the driving force behind the state of emergency’s 
employment in moments of real or perceived national crisis (4). 
Exception, to them, is a legal tool that restores order by rapidly 
extricating the threats to the polity’s existence. Supporters of this view 
consider that in times of foreign war or internal strife the State is 
compelled to undermine individual freedoms. Dictatorships react to crisis 
in a much effective way than democracies. The very nature of the latter –
mainly enacting decisions after deliberation, consensus and the rule of 
law- may be its own Achilles’ heel. In order for modern democracies to 
survive, they have to recur to non-liberal, but legally framed and 
provisional, measures (5).   
 
After 9/11, the War on Terror has been defined as a national crisis that 
cannot be overcome within the ‘normal’ rule of law. The long term peril to 
democracy, which terrorism poses, is far greater and more permanent 
than the one that the state of exception causes to democratic liberties in 
the short term. The suspension and restriction of fundamental freedoms 
are a small price to pay when a democratic regime is faced with the kind 
of foe that terrorism is. Even such strong advocates of liberal democracy, 
like Michael Ignatieff, believe that the state of emergency is a necessary 
tool to protect society from terrorist attacks (6). To him, the exception in 
a modern democracy can be effectively restrained from committing the 
kind of human rights violations and abuses that were present during the 
French-Algerian War and the Dirty War in Argentina. Ignatieff considers 
that those cases can be avoided, in the current War on Terror, by setting 
up contradictory procedures after targeted killing and aggressive 
interrogation have been implemented(7). Lastly, the provisional 
characteristic of the state of exception must also be properly defined by 
introducing a time limit or by setting up attained objectives.  The problem 
with the latter is that it is difficult to discern when terrorism has been 
actually defeated. Regarding the temporal nature of the exception, it has 
been the case that governments have continued to extend, indefinitely, 
the state of emergency (8). In this sense, Charles Tilly was right when he 
noticed that once the State acquires more power it is extremely difficult, 
or almost impossible, to go back to the previous situation (9).   
 
Ignatieff’s notion that the state of exception can be controlled if it is 
properly framed within the legal order is mistaken. First, following Tilly, 
the State’s behavior is not controllable, particularly within a legal 
framework. Even if the State seems to be making concessions, it is 
actually gaining more command. It is in the State’s nature to increase its 
control over society in order to assure its survival(10). Therefore, the state 
of exception will never be controlled by the legal order. Terrorism overtly 
defies the essence of the State: its monopoly of the use of violence. To 
protect itself the State will disregard the rule of law if necessary.  
 
Secondly, the exception cannot be legal in any sense because, as said by 
Giorgio Agamben, it is the negation of law (11). Agamben considers 
exception as it has been defined by Schmitt: the nature of sovereign 
power. Consequently, it can never be framed by the rule of law. In fact, 
when the exception is enacted law ceases to exist. When national crisis 
occur, a State will make decisions based on necessity, not on 
lawfulness.  Accordingly, if the rule of law is negated and the newly 
acquired faculties are not relinquished after the crisis has passed, the 
exception represents the transition of a democratic regime into an 
authoritarian or autocratic one. There is a divide in literature regarding 
this issue: some deem that the exception creates a provisional 
dictatorship but once the crisis is over democracy returns in full force, 
others see the exception as a one way ticket ride. According to Rossiter 
when the state of exception is declared, a democratic regime turns into a 
provisional dictatorship by granting extraordinary authority and powers 
to the executive (12). Ignatieff, following Rossiter, considers Italy and 
Germany during the 70s, by naming them ‘selective dictatorships’, to 
show how modern democracies used the state of exception to tackle 
terrorism and returned to the rule of law once the threat had ended (13).   
 
However, the provisional and extraordinary measures passed in both 
countries have never been suspended. They are still in place and 
sporadically and selectively used. As a result, the provisional feature of 
the exception never actually materializes. Authors, like Hannah Arendt 
and Frances Fox Piven, explain how the suspension, restriction and 
infringement of constitutional rights and individual freedoms by the 
necessity of the state of exception permanently erode democracies by 
introducing autocratic measures (14). Arendt wonderfully describes how 
democracy died in the Weimer Republic when Chancellor Bruning 
declared the state of emergency in 1930, and not the moment Hitler 
raised into power in 1933 (15). For Arendt, from the moment the 
exception was enacted until Hitler took over the Chancellery, the path to 
dictatorship was irreversibly one. Piven regards the declaration of the 
state of emergency in the United States in September 2001 as the crucial 
moment where democratic liberties started to irrevocably fade away in 
the name of necessity (16). The subsequent restrictions to individual 
freedoms were accepted as necessary sacrifices to avert a catastrophe. It 
was not considered that the greater evil was not the one posed by 
terrorists; but, the permanent damage made to democracy by the State. 
Democracy is still far from dying in the United States, but its agony may 
have already started.  
 
The state of exception requires another ingredient to remain in effect 
indefinitely and permanently harm democracy. The State’s intentions –if 
there is such an oxymoron- are not sufficient alone. Legitimacy, as Weber 
so cleverly insisted upon, is also needed (17). Arendt showcased how the 
transformation of the Weimar Republic, from a democracy into a 
totalitarian regime, mainly depended on the masses (18). In modern 
democracies it is the general public, the citizenship or the masses who 
always have the final voice on any matter. Governments’ actions have to 
be legitimized by the public in order to be truly effective. They are 
accepted if they are not broadly contested or if they are enthusiastically 
received. They are not perceived as legitimate when they produce protests 
against them (19).  
 
The measures taken by the U.S. Government after 9/11 have received its 
share of criticism, but they have not been openly contested by the public 
in a massive way. In fact, there has been a strong consensus from the 
American citizenship. It may have been a tacit consensus between the 
executive, Congress and the citizens; but, the case remains that the 
suspension, restrictions and infringement to fundamental liberties have 
been seen as a necessary sacrifice to assure the security of the nation 
(20).  Even controversial and dangerous measures as targeted 
assassination or torture have been widely accepted -in an extremely 
cheerfully way in some cases (21)- by the general public. Perhaps, the 
public truly considers them appropriate and it is willing to risk democracy 
for security. However, it would seem that the compliance comes from the 
perception that they will never be subject to those measures. The majority 
of the people of the United States do not consider themselves targeted by 
the restrictions to individual freedoms, and will never feel that way. For 
them it is easy to make sacrifice a minority’s fundamental liberties. It has 
been the case in every country where the state of exception has been 
declared for terrorist activities. The idea that ‘it will never happen to me’ 
precludes the perception of being on the verge of loosing any kind of 
freedom. Interestingly, Karl Marx, in the XVIII Brumaire, warned us 
about the dangers of a massive support for an autocratic State in the 
name of security (22). 
Conclusion 
The current War on Terror shows how close a stable and 
mature,democratic regime is to absolutely disregard the rule of law in 
favor of necessity. History and political theory has demonstrated that 
many authoritarian governments and dictatorships originate with a 
declaration of the state of exception. The measures taken by the 
enactment of the exception are not only immoral, they are unnecessary 
and illegal. The lesser evil is always less when it is not applied to the 
majority of the population. No matter how small the amount of 
individuals affected by the restrictions on their liberties, the damage done 
to democracy –and to their lives- is permanent and with grave 
repercussions for the future. Terrorism is a strategy used by a small group 
of people that pose no vital danger to the State’s institutions or to 
democracy. The real danger to a democratic regime is the State’s reaction 
to terrorism and the public’s acceptance of them. Terrorists can be 
effectively persecuted within the rule of law. No worst case scenario can 
justify the torture, the indefinite imprisonment and the assassination of 
an innocent individual. The possible avoidance of a worst case scenario is 
never the lesser evil when it requires fundamental freedoms to be 
sacrificed. Finally, it is the public who always has the last word, and who 
is ultimately responsible for the known actions taken by their 
government. The choice between the rule of law and necessity, eventually, 
relies on them. 
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